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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 150 years, war and political zeal have caused the death of millions 
of innocent civilians around the world.  The civilized world agreed that those deaths 
required justice and accountability.  Unfortunately, achieving justice and 
accountability has always proved more difficult than calling for it.  Nonetheless, the 
United States has always been the leading advocate for accountability and justice for 
crimes committed against civilian populations.  However, at a time when the rest of 
the world finally stepped forward and declared that crimes against civilian 
populations will not be tolerated, the United States has decided to take a giant step 
backward.   
At a conference in Rome, nations from around the globe created the International 
Criminal Court to hold accountable and punish those responsible for genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  When the moment of truth arrived for the 
United States, the United States opposed the formation of the International Criminal 
Court.  Moreover, in response to the existence of the Court, the United States took 
measures to insulate itself from the jurisdiction of the Court by enacting the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act.  The United States justified its 
opposition and actions against the Court by stating that the Court was a fatally 
flawed system.  The United States alleged the jurisdiction of the Court was too 
broad, that there were no checks on the Court to prevent politically motivated 
prosecutions and that the Court did not have the obligation to respect the 
Constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.   
An examination of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act reveals that it 
is ineffective in protecting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the Court.  
Furthermore, the Rome Statute’s articles, which established the International 
Criminal Court, do not support the legal arguments presented by the United States 
against the International Criminal Court.  In sum, the United States does not have a 
valid basis for its opposition to the International Criminal Court. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A.  Warfare – Impetus for the Creation of an International Criminal Court 
The creation of a court to deal with war crimes or crimes against humanity is not 
a novel idea.  Evidence exists that ad hoc tribunals tried enemy combatants for 
transgressions committed during the course of war as early as the fifth century B.C.1
Calls for international criminal courts have generally been the loudest and the most 
desperate in the aftermath of wars or conflicts that resulted in atrocities perpetrated 
upon civilian populations.   
The drafting of the Rome Statute, its ratification by eighty-seven countries, and 
the subsequent creation of a permanent International Criminal Court can be seen as a 
delayed response to the calls for justice following the wars waged in Europe in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century.2  The first proposal for a permanent international 
criminal court occurred in January of 1872 in response to atrocities committed by 
both sides of the Franco-Prussian war.   Gustav Moynier, a founding member of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, proposed the establishment of a 
permanent court to adjudicate violations of the 1864 Geneva Convention.3  A second 
proposal to establish an international criminal tribunal came on the heels of the First 
World War.4  In the aftermath of the First World War, a commission of inquiry for 
the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference recommended that the Allies establish an ad
hoc criminal tribunal with limited jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.5  In 1937, a third bid to establish the international criminal court was made 
to the League of Nations by France in response to the 1934 assassination of France’s 
Prime Minister.6    France’s proposal failed to establish a permanent court with 
jurisdiction over attacks upon government officials and civilians. 7   The last 
                                                                
1See generally Christopher Keith Hall, The Origins of the ICC Concept (1872-1945), THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT MONITOR 6 (November 1997), at
http://icc.igc.org/publications/monitor/06/monitor06.199711.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2003) (on 
file with author).  Ad hoc tribunals were established by the victor of a battle or war and dealt 
with breaches of acceptable behavior on the battlefield and acceptable treatment of military 
and civilian prisoners of war. 
2Id.
3Id.  Moynier’s proposal was to establish a court by treaty with automatic court activation 
upon the commencement of hostilities between combatant states.  Id.  The proposal was 
overwhelmingly rejected by international lawyers of Moynier’s era.  Id.
4Id.  World War I hostilities ceased on Nov. 11, 1918 and the Peace Treaty of Versailles 
came into force June 28, 1919.  The Peace Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 440.  
5Id. More specifically, the tribunal was proposed in order to prosecute William II of 
Hohenzollern, the former German Emperor, for the “supreme offence against international 
morality and the sanctity of treaties.”  The Peace Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 227.  
The Allies never adopted the Commission’s recommendations and consequently, neither an ad
hoc tribunal nor Allied military tribunal was created.  Id.
6See generally Hall, supra note 1.  France convinced the League of Nations Assembly to 
adopt a treaty creating a permanent court but ultimately, the treaty was ratified by only one 
country.  Id.
7Id.
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significant historical appeal for a permanent international criminal court came after 
the close of the Second World War.8  Once again, the proposal was in response to 
atrocities committed upon various civilian populations by German officials and the 
German military over the course of the Second World War.  However, the victorious 
Allies quickly chose to establish and convene ad hoc tribunals in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo rather than delay the trials until a permanent criminal court could be 
established.9
The proposals for a permanent criminal court having jurisdiction over war crimes 
and crimes against humanity did not end with the rendering of the judgments at 
Nuremberg. However, the rare opportunity for a unified coalition to establish an 
international court in response to unprecedented crimes against humanity would not 
present itself again. 10   Consequently, proposals made after the close of the 
Nuremberg Trial were entirely rejected or supplanted by temporary ad hoc tribunals 
with limited jurisdiction over specified conflicts until the adoption and ratification of 
the Rome Statute.11
B.  Stepping-Stones Toward Establishing a Permanent International Criminal Court 
In hindsight, the Allied forces probably made the correct decision by quickly 
establishing the ad hoc Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.  More than fifty-five years 
of defining, drafting, preparatory committees, and atrocities against civilian 
populations would pass before the creation of a permanent international criminal 
court.12  However, under the direction of the United Nations, the building blocks 
necessary to create an effective permanent criminal court were slowly being set in 
place.
Approximately two years after the Nuremberg Trial, on December 9, 1948, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.13  The Convention defined the crime of 
genocide and called for the prosecution of the accused by “a competent tribunal of 
the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international 
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.”14  Even with the adoption of the convention 
                                                                
8Id.
9Id.
10 See generally Michael P. Scharf, The Politics Behind U.S. Opposition to the 
International Criminal Court, The Brown Journal of World Affairs (Winter/Spring 1999), 
available at http://www.brown.edu/Students/Journal_of_World_Affairs/scharf61.pdf (last 
visited Jan 12, 2003) archived at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive.cfm?targetpage 
=6.1 (on file with author).  
11See generally Hall, supra note 1.  Examples of the ad hoc tribunal solution are the 
International Criminal Tribunals created in response to war crimes committed in Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia.  See generally, Punishing War Crimes: International Criminal 
Tribunals, at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JQB5/FILE/Punishing_
War_Crimes.pdf.  (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). 
12Id.
13 See generally A History of the ICC, available at http://iccnow.org/documents/ 
iccbasics.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with author).   
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on genocide, the movement toward the International Criminal Court was stifled by 
the political climate of the Cold War and was not to be revisited until 1989.15
After 1989, a succession of events, in a relatively short span of time, appeared to 
drive the creation of the International Criminal Court.  In June of 1989 the United 
Nations General Assembly asked the International Law Commission (“ILC”) to 
prepare a draft statute for the International Criminal Court.16  As the ILC worked on 
the draft statute, war in the former Yugoslavia broke out bringing renewed calls for 
the creation of a permanent criminal court.17  The Yugoslav war produced atrocities 
in Bosnia and Croatia that were compared to the atrocities committed by the German 
military during the Second World War. 18   In May of 1993, in response to the 
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations adopted a Security Council 
resolution establishing a temporary ad hoc tribunal to deal specifically with the 
prosecution of those responsible for atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.19  Then in 
1994, two events occurred that seemed to accelerate the creation of the International 
Criminal Court.  First, on the heels of the formation of the Yugoslav tribunal, large-
scale massacres during the Rwandan civil war culminated in the creation of a second 
temporary ad hoc tribunal with specific jurisdiction over the atrocities committed in 
Rwanda.20   The second event in 1994 was the ILC’s submission to the United 
Nations General Assembly of its final statutory draft for establishment of the 
International Criminal Court and its recommendation that a conference be convened 
to draft a treaty enacting the statute.21  The General Assembly appointed a committee 
to review the ILC’s final draft statute and in December of 1995 it established a three 
                                                          
14See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for 
signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. 6, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
instree/x1cppcg.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (emphasis added).  The United States ratified 
the Convention and accepted its articles with two reservations; one significant reservation was 
that United States’ consent was necessary for the International Court of Justice to exert 
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens.  Similar to the convention on genocide, the Rome Statute 
allows for prosecution by national courts or by the International Criminal Court.  See Rome 
Statute, infra note 26, at art. 17(1)(a). 
15See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, Getting Aggressive About Preventing Aggression,
The Brown Journal of World Affairs (Spring 1999), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/html/ferencz199907.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with 
author).
16See generally A History of the ICC, supra note 13.  Prior to 1989, the waging of the 
Cold War put the International Criminal Court on hold.  Conversely, the end of the Cold War 
fosters a climate more amenable to the establishment of an International Criminal Court.  
During the Cold War the major powers were unwilling to create a court with the authority to 
investigate and punish aggressive national behavior, especially since it was likely that one of 
the major powers was likely to be the aggressor.  See Scharf, supra note 10 at 97.   
17Id.
18See generally Ferencz, supra note 15. 
19See generally S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S-RES-827_93.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 
2002). (Editors note: this site is restricted.) 
20See generally A History of the ICC, supra note 13. 
21Id.
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year Preparatory Committee to finalize the statute to be presented to a conference of 
plenipotentiaries. 22   By June of 1998, the Preparatory Committee’s work was 
completed and presented to a United Nations Diplomatic Conference held in Rome, 
Italy.23  In Rome, the participating members amended the ILC’s draft to address 
deficiencies and the concerns of member states, including those of the United States.  
At the close of the conference, the 160 members overwhelmingly voted to adopt the 
final draft and the statute became known as the Rome Statute.24  Only, the United 
States, Israel, China, Libya, Iraq, Qatar and Yemen actually voted against the 
Statute.25
Although the United Nations Conference adopted the Rome Statute in July of 
1998, the treaty entered force and established a permanent International Criminal 
Court on July 1, 2002, after the requisite sixty countries acceded to or ratified the 
Statute.26
III. THE UNITED STATES POSITION AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
During the Rome Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the United States objected to 
several provisions of the Rome Statute and attempted to address those concerns at 
the conference.27  Having been unable to garner support for its proposed changes to 
the Rome Statute, the United States voted against the Rome Statute and did not sign 
it at the close of the Rome Conference.28  However, the U.S. delegation continued to 
participate in U.N. Preparatory Commission meetings in an attempt to rectify the 
perceived flaws in the Rome Statute.29  Ultimately, despite reservations, President 
Clinton hoped that U.S. concerns could be addressed in future preparatory meetings 
and signed the Rome Statute on the final day that it was open for signatures.30
However, when further U.S. efforts to modify and restrict the Rome Statute met with 
strong opposition and ultimate failure, the United States began to take action against 
                                                                
22Id. Plenipotentiary is a diplomatic agent with power to negotiate on behalf of their 
country.  See www.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary/plenipotentiary. 
23Id.
24Id.  120 Countries voted to adopt the Rome Statute at the conference in Rome. 
25See Scharf, supra note 10, at 101.  Eventually, 139 Countries signed the Rome Statute 
prior to the closing date on Dec. 31, 2000, including the United States.  See infra note 26. 
26 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court, 10th Session, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998)  available at http://www.un.org/icc.  
[hereinafter Rome Statute].  As of December 18, 2002, eighty-seven countries ratified the 
Rome Statute and became member states bound by its Articles and the International Criminal 
Court’s jurisdiction.  Id.
27See generally Under Secretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Remarks to the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 6, 2002), available at
http://state.gov/p/9949.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with author). 
28Id.
29Id.
30See generally U.S. Signs ICC on Final Day for Signing, INT’L ENFORCEMENT LAW 
REPORTER, Feb. 2001 (on file with author). 
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the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).31  United States hostility toward the ICC 
became official in a May 6, 2002, letter to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations that declared the United States did not intend to become a party to the Rome 
Statute despite its signature of the Statute.32
A.  Ineffective U.S. Measures Taken Against the International Criminal Court  
1.  American Servicemembers’ Protection Act:  Patriotic Title, Minimal  
Legislative Firepower  
The first attack on the ICC came in June of 2000 when U.S. Senators decided to 
take a proactive approach to the inevitable establishment of the ICC. 33  Legislation 
was introduced and eventually enacted prohibiting extradition, funding, and 
cooperation with the ICC, as well as restricting U.S. participation in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations, prohibiting military assistance to ICC member States and 
allowing the President to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to free U.S. 
personnel held by the ICC.34  The legislation came to be known as the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (“Servicemembers’ Act”) and was enacted to 
counter the Rome Statute and its potential ability to exert jurisdiction over American 
military personnel and senior U.S. officials.35  While the title is very patriotic, the 
numerous exceptions and waivers contained in the Act remove its potential to 
achieve its stated goal of “protecting” U.S. military personnel from the ICC.  The 
number and scope of the waivers contained within the Servicemembers’ Act have 
fueled speculation that the Act was specifically enacted to intimidate countries that 
have ratified or are contemplating ratification of the Rome Statute.36
                                                                
31President Clinton’s hope that the Rome Statute would be modified to the satisfaction of 
the United States never materialized.  The election of George W. Bush as President of the 
United States seemed to hasten and intensify U.S. opposition to the ICC. 
32 See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, Washington, to Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United Nations (May 6, 
2002), at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/5/6/114156.shtml (last visited Jan 
12, 2003) (on file with author). 
33See Colum Lynch, GOP Bill Would Bar U.S. Cooperation in War Crimes Tribunal,
Washington Post, June 14, 2000, at A14. 
34See American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7422-7433 (2002).  The 
Act allows for waivers to almost every prohibition contained in the Act; allowing for 
appearances at the ICC to challenge jurisdiction over cases or investigations before the ICC.  
Id. The Act even allows the U.S. to assist in international efforts to apprehend Saddam 
Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, members of Al Qaeda and Islamic Jihad, and 
other foreign nationals “accused of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity.”  22 
U.S.C. § 7433 (2002) (emphasis added). 
35Id. at § 7421 et seq. 
36 See generally U.S.: “Hague Invasion Act” Becomes Law, White House “Stops at 
Nothing” in Campaign Against War Crimes Court, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/
aspa080302.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with author). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
270 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:263
a.  Ineffective Prohibition on Extradition and Consent to Extradition 
A provision found within the Servicemembers’ Act is the prohibition against 
extradition or transfer of United States citizens to the ICC. 37   The extradition 
prohibition provision states the United States may neither extradite nor give its 
consent to a third country to extradite U.S. citizens to a country that is a member of 
the Rome Statute.38  However, the provision contains significant exceptions to the 
prohibition on extradition.  The Servicemembers’ Act allows for extradition to a 
Rome Statute member State if assurances are given that there will be no further 
extradition to the ICC.39  Essentially, the United States will allow extradition of U.S. 
citizens to an ICC State having proper jurisdiction over a crime, as long as the State 
assures the United States that the State will prosecute the case in its national courts 
and not through the ICC.  A comparison of the language contained in the 
Servicemembers’ Act with the Rome Statute reveals the Servicemembers’ Act does 
not grant the United States any more authority than it already has under the Rome 
Statute.  For example, the Rome Statute states the only avenue available for the ICC 
to gain possession of a suspect located in a non-member country is to “request” 
cooperation for the arrest and surrender of the suspect.40  Since the ICC is limited to 
“requesting” the surrender of a suspect in the custody of non-member States, the 
language in the Rome Statute establishes that the United States, as a non-member, is 
under no obligation to surrender or extradite U.S. citizens in U.S. custody.  Secondly, 
the Rome Statute provides for, and encourages, national courts with jurisdiction over 
the committed crime to prosecute the crimes specified by the Statute.41  By having 
custody of its own citizen, the articles of the Rome Statute concede the United States 
would have jurisdiction over the suspect and could prosecute the case in U.S. courts.  
Arguably, the extradition prohibition provision of the Servicemembers’ Act does 
nothing to limit the actual jurisdiction of the ICC; it merely restates the rights of the 
United States contained within the Rome Statute.  Consequently, the prohibition 
against the U.S. extradition of U.S. citizens to the ICC can be seen as completely 
unnecessary and redundant to the articles of the Rome Statutes.     
                                                                
37See 22 U.S.C. § 7402. 
38Id. at § 7402(a), (b). 
39Id.
40Compare 22 U.S.C. § 7423(d) with Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 89(1).  Article 89 
clearly states the court may “request” the cooperation of any State where the person may be 
found in order to obtain the arrest and surrender of the person.  Although the Servicemembers’ 
Act expressly prohibits cooperation with the ICC under § 7423(d), it also provides for several 
waivers to the prohibitions against cooperation.  For example, the United States may cooperate 
with the ICC if: 1) there is reason to believe the suspect actually committed a crime falling 
under ICC jurisdiction; 2) no U.S. citizen will be investigated or prosecuted as a result of the 
cooperation; or 3) cooperation with the ICC is in the national interest of the United States.  22 
U.S.C. § 7422(c)(2). 
41See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 17(1)(a), (b), (c).  Article 17 allows any country, 
including non-member States with jurisdiction, to prosecute the case.  The United States has 
the option to exert jurisdiction and investigate or prosecute if it desired. 
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The Servicemembers’ Act also states that consent will not be given for a third 
country to extradite a U.S. citizen to the ICC.42  The prohibition against consent to 
extradition by a third country is also ineffective in deterring ICC jurisdiction.  In the 
situation where an ICC member State has custody of a U.S. citizen and refers a case 
to the ICC, the lack of U.S. consent for extradition could not actually stop the 
extradition from taking place.  Similarly, where the ICC has physical custody of a 
U.S. citizen, the Servicemembers’ Act only reiterates the rights of the United States 
under the Rome Statute.  For instance, the Servicemembers’ Act authorizes the 
United States to appear before the ICC and use the articles of the Rome Statute to 
challenge the courts jurisdiction and remove the case to U.S. courts.43  Once again, 
this option is already available to the United States under the Rome Statute 
regardless of the fact the United States is not a member to the Statute.  Yet again, 
nothing in the Servicemembers’ Act significantly differs from the Rome Statute or 
actually affects ICC jurisdiction once the court obtains custody of a U.S. citizen. 
Consequently, the Servicemembers’ prohibition on extradition and consent to 
extradition can be characterized as nothing more than a restatement of the rights 
available to the United States under the Rome Statute.  While it is a forgone 
conclusion the United States will not extradite U.S. citizens to countries within ICC 
jurisdiction, the prohibition on granting extradition consent to a third country is 
likely to have little affect once that country decides to extradite U.S. citizens to the 
ICC.  Therefore this portion of the Servicemembers’ Act is wholly unnecessary as 
well as ineffective in protecting U.S. citizens from extradition to the ICC. 
b.  Ineffective Restrictions on Participation in United Nations  
Peacekeeping Operations 
The Servicemembers’ Act also restricts United States military personnel from 
participation in any peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations 
Security Council, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.44  Although the language 
indicates the United States will not participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations 
unless absolute immunity is granted, in reality the waivers to the conditions 
contained in the provision make the prohibition ineffective.45   
Comparable to the Servicemembers’ Act concerning extradition, the first 
condition allowing for peacekeeping participation is nothing more than a reiteration 
of an article found in the Rome Statute.  Similar to the Rome Statute, this condition 
states the United States will not participate in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations unless U.S. military personnel are permanently exempted from ICC 
investigation and prosecution through a Security Council resolution.46   While a 
                                                                
42See 22 U.S.C. § 7402(b).  
43Compare 22 U.S.C. § 7427(c)(3) with Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 18, 19.  
Section 7427(c)(3) permits the United States to challenge ICC jurisdiction under Articles 18 
and 19 of the Rome Statute. 
44See 22 U.S.C. § 7424(b). 
45Id.
46Compare Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 16 with 22 U.S.C. § 7424(b).  ICC 
jurisdiction over Security Council approved operations can be deferred by a Security Council 
resolution.  
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permanent exemption would be very effective in protecting U.S. military personnel 
from ICC prosecution, the Rome Statute does not recognize a permanent Security 
Council deferral.  Instead, the Rome Statute provides for a twelve-month Security 
Council deferral that can be renewed by the Security Council, if the Council sees 
fit.47
A permanent Security Council exemption would be effective in protecting U.S. 
troops from ICC prosecutions if the U.S. made it an absolute prerequisite to 
participation of U.S. military personnel in U.N. peacekeeping operations.  
Unfortunately, a waiver to the permanent exemption exists which permits the 
President to commit U.S. troops without obtaining Security Council deferral if the 
“national interest” of the United States justifies its participation in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. 48   The presence of the waiver actually exposes the 
weakness of the restriction against peacekeeping operations and the lack of valid 
concern over potential ICC jurisdiction over U.S. troops.  The weakness of the 
restriction on peacekeeping is evidenced by the absence of a definition of “national 
interest” in the Servicemembers’ Act. 49   According to the language of the 
Servicemembers’ Act, all that is necessary to invoke the “national interest” waiver is 
a Presidential certification to a Congressional committee stating that U.S. 
peacekeeping participation is in the nation’s interest. 50   Furthermore, the 
Servicemembers’ Act does not state the President must get Congressional approval 
over his decision that U.S. peacekeeping participation is in the nation’s interest.51
Together, the lack of definition and the lack of required Congressional approval 
suggest the President has wide discretion to determine what constitutes “national 
interest.”  Consequently, the President could decide to commit U.S. personnel upon 
his subjective opinion of “national interest,” thereby expanding the opportunities for 
U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations despite the absence of permanent 
immunity as called for in the Servicemembers’ Act.   
In theory, it can be argued the U. S. will pursue the Security Council deferments 
specified in the Rome Statute prior to U.S. participation in peacekeeping or 
enforcement action.  However, a Security Council deferral may be difficult to obtain.  
Under United Nations guidelines, all that is necessary to defeat a deferral resolution 
by the Security Council is one veto by a permanent member of the Security 
Council. 52   Keeping in mind the United Nations and the Security Council are 
                                                                
47See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 16.  The Rome Statute recognizes a twelve-
month deferral when issued by the United Nations Security Council that can be renewed by 
the Security Council. 
48See 22 U.S.C. § 7424(c)(3).   
49Compare Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 17 with 22 U.S.C. § 7424(c)(3).  The 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act does not undertake to define “national interest” in 
order to clarify its application.  Conversely, the Rome Statute does define “unwillingness” and 
“inability” thereby, giving some basis for challenges to the jurisdiction of the court for both a 
State and the ICC Prosecutor. 
50See 22 U.S.C. § 7424(b), (c)(3). 
51Id.
52See U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3, available at  http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last 
visited Jan 14, 2003) (“[d]ecisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made 
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent 
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basically political bodies, a veto based on political pressure or tactics would certainly 
not be surprising.  For example, while France and Great Britain are U.S. allies, they 
are also members of the Rome Statute and the European Union.  Consequently, 
France and Britain are susceptible to European Union pressure not to undermine the 
ICC by voting for U.S. immunity through a Security Council resolution.53  Moreover, 
Russia and China, the remaining permanent members of the Security Council and 
frequent political rivals of the United States, may also vote against a resolution 
granting U.S. immunity.  A single veto would defeat the deferral resolution and force 
the United States to choose between non-participation, resulting in minimized 
influence over global conflicts, or participating in peacekeeping operations despite 
exposing U.S. personnel to ICC jurisdiction. 
The language of the Servicemembers’ Act is intended to suggest the United 
States will not participate in United Nation peacekeeping operations without 
permanent immunity for its military personnel.  However, the potential hurdles 
facing a Security Council deferral, the Rome Statute’s twelve-month limitation on 
Security Council deferrals and the expansive Presidential power to invoke the 
“national interest” waiver significantly weaken the impact and protective potential of 
the prohibition against participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.   
c.  Ineffective Prohibition on Military Assistance to Rome Statute Member States 
The Servicemembers’ Act also purports to prohibit United States military 
assistance to those countries that are parties to the Rome Statute.54  The very first 
provision of this section ominously states “no United States military assistance may 
be provided to the government of a country that is a party to the International 
Criminal Court.”55  At first glance, this language would seem to suggest an absolute 
bar to U.S. military assistance to Rome Statue countries.  But once again, significant 
waivers contained in this section of the Servicemembers’ Act manage to eviscerate 
the potential effectiveness of the Act to protect U.S. military personnel from ICC 
jurisdiction.  
                                                          
members”) (emphasis added).  If a permanent member casts a negative vote, the draft 
resolution being voted on does not pass.  Id. This is known as the “great Power of unanimity”, 
often referred to as “veto” power.  The five permanent members of the Security Council are 
China, France, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
and United States of America.  Id. at art 23, ¶ 1.
53See generally Mathew Lee, US Rebukes Europe for Warning EU Aspirants Not to Sign 
ICC Immunity Deals, Agence France Presse, August 13, 2002, General News (on file with 
author); see also EU Council Approves Common Position Rejecting U.S. Bi-lateral 
Agreements: Fifteen Member States Articulate Political Benchmarks Regarding Non-
Surrender to ICC, at http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/ciccmediastatements.html (last visited 
Jan 14, 2003) (on file with author).  As is evident by the headlines, the present prevailing 
European attitude toward U.S. impunity in regard to the ICC is not favorable.  The probability 
of obtaining a Security Council resolution approving U.S. immunity from ICC investigation 
and prosecution may be difficult to pass due to the occurrence of a permanent member veto.  
See U.N. Charter, supra note 52. 
54See 22 U.S.C. § 7426. 
55Id.
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The most significant waiver is found in section 7426(d) of the Servicemembers’ 
Act, which covers all the “exemptions” to the prohibition of military aid.56  Simply 
stated, the countries that will continue to receive U.S. military assistance whether or 
not they are members of the ICC are: 1) NATO members, 2) major non-NATO allies 
(“including Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, the Republic of Korea, 
and New Zealand”) and 3) Taiwan.57  The NATO exemption itself is a significant 
reduction in protection for U.S. military personnel since sixteen of the eighteen 
NATO allies are parties to the ICC.58  Of the sixteen NATO allies, fifteen are located 
in Europe and surround the seat of the ICC, the Netherlands.59  In and of itself the 
NATO exemption manages to undermine the effectiveness of the military aid 
prohibition.  However, by combining the “major non-NATO” and NATO 
exemptions, the total number of ICC countries exempted is twenty and allows for 
nearly global U.S. military assistance.60  Furthermore, while the “non-NATO” clause 
lists only eight countries as “major non-NATO” allies, the language in the text 
suggests the list could be expanded, potentially increasing the number of exemptions 
for ICC member States.61  In essence, the NATO and non-NATO combination truly 
renders the military aid prohibition virtually meaningless. 
While the NATO and non-NATO exemption encompasses the countries that are 
universally important to the United States, the Servicemembers’ Act provides yet 
another waiver that exempts countries from the military aid prohibition as they 
become important to the United States.  The “national interest” waiver found in this 
section of the Servicemembers’ Act is nearly identical to the “national interest” 
waiver found in the prohibition on participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.62
As before, the language of the “national interest” waiver grants the President broad 
powers to determine what constitutes “national interest” and allows him to render 
U.S. military assistance to countries despite their participation in the ICC.   
In effect, the prohibition on military aid will only affect countries whose present 
significance to the United States is minimal.  The NATO and “major non-NATO” 
                                                                
56The exemptions to the prohibition against military assistance should not be confused 
with the “national interest” waiver of the prohibition on military assistance contained in this 
section of the Servicemembers’ Act. Id.
57See 22 U.S.C. § 7426(d). 
58 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 26, available at http://untreaty.un. 
org/ENGLISH/ bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Jan 16, 
2003) (website displays signatories and ratifications of the Rome Statute).  The NATO 
members that are parties to the Rome Statute are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain.  Id.
59Id. The European NATO members that are party to the Rome Statute are: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain.  Id.
60See 22 U.S.C. § 7426(d)(2).  Argentina, Australia, Jordan, and New Zealand are non-
NATO allies that are also ICC member States.  Id. 
61Id.  The text uses the word “including” when listing the eight “major non-NATO” allies, 
inferring the list is not limited to those countries enumerated in the text. 
62Compare 22 U.S.C. § 7426(b) with 22 U.S.C. § 7424(c)(3). 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss2/6
2004] SHOT HEARD ‘ROUND THE WORLD’ 275
exemptions provide military assistance to countries that are politically and militarily 
important to the United States while the “national interest” waiver insures U.S. 
military assistance to countries as they become important to the United States.  
Arguably, the “national interest” waiver completely destroys what little effectiveness 
the military aid prohibition had following the NATO and non-NATO exemptions.  
The breadth of the waiver and exemptions indicate that in effect, no prohibition on 
military assistance actually exists, thus making the prohibition meaningless and 
further diminishing the protective potential of the Servicemembers’ Act.  Therefore, 
the prohibition on military aid can be properly categorized as a tool of “persuasion” 
rather than an effective ban on military aid.63   
d.  Improbable Use of Military Force to Free Detained or Imprisoned  
U.S. Personnel 
The Servicemembers’ Act also contains a section titled the “Authority to Free 
Members of the Armed Forces of the United States and Certain Other Persons 
Detained or Imprisoned by or On Behalf of the International Criminal Court” 
(“Authority to Free”).64  This section contains a provision conferring authority to the 
President of the United States to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to free 
U.S. personnel being “detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of 
the International Criminal Court.”65  This section of the Servicemembers’ Act has 
been read as authorizing the President of the United States to use military force to 
free ICC detained personnel.66  Furthermore, nothing in the Servicemembers’ Act 
even remotely suggests the President would require the approval or consent of any 
other political body prior to using military force to free detainees.67  Although this 
provision seems to grant the President the authority to use force against the ICC, the 
actual use of force to free ICC detainees is highly improbable considering the legal 
                                                                
63See generally Lee, supra note 53 (quoting United States Secretary of State Colin Powell 
who admitted the U.S. had used the threat of withdrawing military aid as a means to persuade 
countries to sign non-extradition treaties with the U.S. while conversely admitting the U.S. 
was not “bludgeoning or threatening any of our friends”).  See also Press Release, Asian 
Forum for Human Rights and Development, Reject Impunity for U.S. War Criminals (Sept. 5, 
2002), at http://www.iccnow.org/html/pressforumasia20020905.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) 
(stating the U.S. has threatened its Asian allies with “the withdrawal of military aid” if they 
ratify the Rome Statute) (on file with author).  The discrepancy in the use of the 
Servicemembers’ Act’s prohibition on military assistance exemplifies the intended use of the 
prohibition as a tool to achieve bilateral impunity agreements with Rome Statute countries 
rather than a complete ban on military aid to countries that are members of the ICC. 
64See 22 U.S.C. § 7427.
65See id. at § 7427(a).   
66See generally U.S.: “Hague Invasion Act” Becomes Law, supra note 36.    
67See 22 U.S.C. § 7427.  Along with granting the President the power to use military force 
to attain the freedom of detainees, this section of the Servicemembers’ Act does not require 
the President to notify or obtain the approval of Congress prior to using military force.  Id.  
Furthermore, no other sections of the Act place any restrictions on the “Authority to Free” 
section.  See generally American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, supra note 34.  Therefore, 
the Servicemembers’ Act seems to grant the President unfettered discretion on the use of 
military action when it pertains to the ICC and U.S. detainees.  Id.
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alternatives available to the United States through the Rome Statute and the potential 
repercussions of such action.   
The “Authority to Free” section of the Servicemembers’ Act also contains the 
more innocuous alternatives to the use of military force by permitting legal 
assistance to an ICC detainee.68  Arguably, this is one of the few provisions in the 
Servicemembers’ Act that actually offers “protection” to U.S. personnel in the 
custody of the ICC.  Under the “Authority to Free” section, the President may 
authorize the following: 1) legal representation for the detainee; 2) production of 
exculpatory evidence on behalf of the detainee; and 3) the appearance before the ICC 
to challenge the admissibility or jurisdiction of the court under Articles 18 and 19 of 
the Rome Statute.69  Oddly enough, while the United States has declared the Rome 
Statute and the ICC to be fatally flawed, this section of the Servicemembers’ Act 
permits, if not advocates, the utilization of the “flawed” Articles of the Rome Statute 
and its mechanisms to gain the freedom of U.S. personnel.70  One possible inference 
from this scenario is that perhaps the Rome Statute is not as flawed as the United 
States would have the world believe.  
Politically, the use of military force to free U.S. detainees from ICC custody 
would be hard to justify and would surely have repercussions.  First, with the 
exception of the Czech Republic and Turkey, every European member of NATO is a 
party to the Rome Statue.71  Consequently, it is highly unlikely the governments of 
those countries would approve or allow U.S. military action against a court endorsed 
by those governments.72  Secondly, the ICC is located in the Netherlands, a NATO 
member and Rome Statute participant.  It is highly unlikely the NATO membership 
would approve of an invasion of another NATO member’s territory in order to free 
persons accused of crimes against humanity.73  Third, it is almost certain the United 
                                                                
73See generally Council Conclusions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
Draft US American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), Council of the European Union, 
68Id. at § 7427(c); see also § 7423(a)(2)(A) (Conversely allowing the use of §7427, and its 
legal assistance provision, despite being titled “Prohibition on Cooperation with the 
International Criminal Court”). 
69See 22 U.S.C.  § 7427(c)(1),(2),(3). 
70See id. at § 7427(c)(3).  It should be noted that in order for the United States to utilize 
Articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute, at minimum, the United States would have to have 
investigated (or be willing to investigate) the defendant.  Id.
71 Compare Rome Statute (signatories), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/ 
bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2003), with
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (membership), available at
http://www.nato.int/welcome/home.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).  Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain and Great Britain are members of both NATO and the Rome Statute. 
72See generally Council Common Position of 11 June 2001 on the International Criminal 
Court, Council of the European Union, June 11, 2001 (on file with author).  The common 
position of the EU indicates that it favors the establishment of the ICC, which further impedes 
any European approval of U.S. military action against the ICC.  Id. Of the European NATO 
and Rome Statute member countries, eleven are also members of the European Union (“EU”).    
See supra note 71; www.eurunion.org/states/home.htm (listing the European Union’s member 
states). 
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Nations Security Council would not approve the use of force against the ICC, 
especially given France and Great Britain’s participation in the ICC and their “veto” 
power over such a resolution.74  Consequently, were the United States to employ 
force in freeing American detainees rather than pursuing peaceful alternatives 
available under Articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute, it would likely have to act 
unilaterally, without the assistance or political support of its major European allies.  
Unilateral action would not be in the “national interest” of the United States; it 
would surely hamper the ability to sustain European support for future military 
operations, such as the war against terrorism.75  For these reasons, the potential use 
of military force by the United States to free ICC detained personnel is virtually non-
existent.   
It cannot be disputed the United States has the military capability to obtain the 
freedom of detainees being held by the ICC.76  However, the use of military force in 
place of legal assistance, against a defenseless court located in the midst of European 
and NATO allies, would have broad negative ramifications on the relationship 
between the United States and its European allies.  Consequently, those ramifications 
make the use of force highly unlikely and tend to support speculation that the threat 
of force was included in the Servicemembers’ Act to intimidate countries that 
ratified or are contemplating ratification of the Rome Statute.77
e.  Hitting the ICC Where it Hurts - Prohibition on Funding to the International 
Criminal Court 
Another prohibition found scattered throughout sections of the Servicemembers’ 
Act prohibits the United States from contributing funding or support to the ICC.78
                                                          
July 11, 2002 (on file with author).  The European Council also expressed concern regarding 
the Servicemembers’ authorization to the President to use “all means necessary” to free 
persons detained “on the territory of EU Member States.”  Id.  Politically, the confluence of 
NATO membership, Rome Statute participation, and European Union membership would 
make European approval of U.S. force almost a certain impossibility.   
74 See generally Council Common Position of 11 June 2001 on the International Criminal 
Court, supra note 72.  Given France and Great Britain’s membership in the European Union 
and the EU’s endorsement of the ICC, their failure to veto a resolution allowing U.S. forces to 
enter Europe and the ICC would likely result in serious repercussions from the European 
community.  Id. 
75 See generally Anita Ramasastry, The Problem with the American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act: Why We Should Not Punish Countries that Participate In the International 
Criminal Court, Wednesday, Nov. 07, 2001, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/ 
20011107_ramasastry.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003) (on file with author) (stating the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act could hamper U.S. efforts to build a coalition in 
the fight against terrorism).   
76The ICC is a court of law backed by the Rome Statute membership.  See generally Rome 
Statute, supra note 26.  It is an entity without a military and without the ability to defend itself 
against attack.  Id. (the Rome Statute does not obligate, nor mandate, the member states to 
provide military assistance or protection to the ICC). 
77See generally U.S.: “Hague Invasion Act” Becomes Law, supra note 36. 
78See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b), 7423(e).  The Servicemembers’ Act also authorizes 
withholding funds from the United Nations that are intended for the ICC. See generally id. at 
§7429.
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Although the funding prohibition is not an independent section within the 
Servicemembers’ Act, it may indeed prove to be the most effective prohibition in an 
otherwise ineffective Servicemembers’ Act.   
The Articles of the Rome Statute clearly provide that funding for the operation of 
the ICC will be derived from assessments to Rome Statue member States,79 the 
United Nations (for expenses incurred in cases referred to the ICC by the Security 
Council),80 and voluntary contributions to the ICC.81  At this point in time the annual 
operating budget of the ICC is unknown, though initial estimates placed the annual 
budget between $10 million and $150 million dollars.82  However, the actual ICC 
budget will most likely mirror the approximately $100 million annual budgets of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia.83  It should be noted 
that unlike the International Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia who 
benefit from U.S. participation in United Nations funding,84 the Servicemembers’ 
Act prohibits the U.S. from contributing directly to the ICC or paying any United 
Nations assessment in connection with the ICC.85
As a result of the prohibition against U.S. funding of the ICC, the entire cost of 
the ICC would be funded by the ICC member States or the United Nations, without 
the participation of the United States, the largest contributor to the United Nations.86
This could ultimately result in a shortage of operating funds for the ICC.  
Consequently, the absence of U.S. funding would affect the ICC’s ability to 
investigate and prosecute the full range of perpetrators and may limit the ICC’s focus 
                                                                
79See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 115(a). 
80Id. at art. 115(b). 
81Id. at art. 116.  The ICC will accept contributions from governments, international 
organizations, corporations, and individuals.  Id.
82See generally Cesare Romano, Financing the ICC: what can be learned from the ad hoc 
tribunals?, at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ReportID=1090 (last visited Jan. 18, 2003) 
(on file with author).   
83See generally Jess Bravin, Bush Presses for Closing of Tribunals, Wall Street Journal, 
February 28, 2002, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2002/ 
0228.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003) (on file with author).  In discussing the potential end of 
the criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. ambassador at 
large for war-crimes issues, stated the annual operating budgets for each tribunal was $100 
million dollars.  Id.
84 See generally U.S. Support for the United Nations: Engagement, Innovation and 
Renewal (September 6, 2000), at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/new/html/Wed_Oct_4_133755 
_2000.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003) (stating the United States is the largest contributor to 
the International Criminal Tribunals) (on file with author). 
85See 22 U.S.C. § 2010; see generally 22 U.S.C. § 7401(b), § 7423(e). 
86See generally Press Release, United Nations Administrative and Budgetary Committee, 
Financial Situation in 2001 ‘Overall Better,’ Says Under-Secretary-General for Management
(Mar. 13, 2002), at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/GAAB3500.doc.htm (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2003) (detailing U.S. contributions to the United Nations and in particular the 
international tribunals) (on file with author).   
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to high profile suspects such as the architects of the crimes.87  This would force 
lower profile defendants, such as soldiers or peacekeepers, to be tried in national 
courts.88   By prohibiting the funding of the ICC, the Servicemembers’ Protection 
Act may actually limit the ICC’s ability to investigate and the scope of its 
investigations; thereby, indirectly protecting U.S. military personnel from ICC 
prosecution. 
2.  Article 98 Agreements – Limited Success Attempting to Circumvent the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court  
The second U.S. attack on the ICC came in the form of attempted bi-lateral 
impunity agreements between the United States and ICC member States.  The bi-
lateral agreements would prohibit ICC member States from transferring U.S. 
personnel to the ICC without the expressed consent of the United States.89  The 
United States is pursuing these bi-lateral agreements under Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute, thereby, giving rise to the name Article 98 Agreements.90
A great deal of debate has centered on whether the Article 98 Agreements being 
pursued by the United States are permissible under the Rome Statute.  However, 
these debates are likely to continue long past any decision regarding the Agreements, 
therefore, the legality of the Agreements will not be analyzed.  Regardless of their 
legality, the United States approached its allies with requests that they sign bilateral 
impunity agreements.  Of the countries reported to have reached bilateral agreements 
with the United States, only eight are Rome Statute member States.91  Of the eight 
ICC member States having agreements with the United States only Romania is 
located within Europe, and its Parliament has refused to ratify the agreement until 
                                                                
87See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 409, 411 (Spring 2000) (explaining how political views and politicians can 
affect the justice system by imposing financial constraints or bureaucracy). 
88This would be similar to the operation of the Nuremberg Trials, the high profile culprits 
of the German atrocities were tried at Nuremberg while lower level guards of death camps 
were prosecuted in national courts.  Another example would be the Israeli prosecution of John 
Demjanjuk for his participation as a guard at the Treblinka death camp.  The process of 
prosecuting high ranking officials through international courts while leaving the lower level 
officials to national courts is a position advocated by the Bush administration for the 
International Criminal Tribunals.  See Bravin, supra note 83.   
89See generally US to Focus on South Asia, Mideast Seeking ICC Immunity Deals, Agence 
France Presse, Nov. 14, 2002, General News (on file with author).  As of Nov. 14, 2002, the 
United States has managed to conclude fourteen bi-lateral agreements with El Salvador, 
Afghanistan, the Dominican Republic, East Timor, Gambia, Honduras, Israel, the Marshall 
Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Palau, Romania, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  Id.
90See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 98(2). 
91See generally U.S. Impunity Agreements: A Summary, at http://www.wfa.org/issues/ 
wicc/article98/art98factsheet.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (stating the 21 countries that 
have engaged in bi-lateral agreements with the United States are Afghanistan, Bahrain, 
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East Timor, El Salvador, Gambia, Georgia, Honduras, India, 
Israel, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Nepal, Palau, Romania, Sri Lanka, 
Tajikistan, Tuvalu, and Uzbekistan) (on file with author).  Afghanistan, Djibouti, East Timor, 
Gambia, Honduras, the Marshall Islands, Romania, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are member 
States to the ICC.  See generally Rome Statute, supra note 26. 
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the European Union and the United States come to a compromise over the Article 98 
Agreements.  While the United States has had limited success in obtaining a 
preliminary agreement with Romania, some European allies stated publicly that they 
will not sign the Article 98 Agreements with the United States.  Canada, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Norway are NATO members that publicly stated they 
are unlikely to sign bi-lateral agreements with the United States.92  Furthermore, the 
European Council issued guiding principles as to the acceptable form of the Article 
98 Agreements.  The European Council’s principles state that any bi-lateral 
agreement as presently drafted by the United States was inconsistent with the Rome 
Statute.  The Council also stated that any future agreement must not allow impunity 
for the accused, may not exempt nationals of ICC member States, may only include 
persons sent by a sending state, and approval of the Agreement must be in 
accordance with the constitution of the State.93
Whether the Article 98 Agreements are within the letter and spirit of the Rome 
Statute may be a moot issue.  Judging from the several key NATO allies that have 
spoken out against the Agreements and the position of the European Union, it seems 
likely the United States will experience some difficulty in arranging bilateral 
agreements with many of its key military and European allies.  The difficulty or 
success by the United States in arranging these bilateral impunity agreements may 
shape the future position of the United States toward the ICC.  However, at this early 
stage of the negotiations it is impossible to anticipate the outcome of the ongoing 
negotiations. 
B.  Unfounded U.S. Concerns Regarding the Rome Statute 
1.  The Jurisdictional Scope of the ICC  
During the Rome Conference, the U.S. delegation’s multifaceted concerns 
regarding the ICC’s jurisdictional scope were at the forefront of negotiations.  
Publicly, the United States stated the Rome Statute allows the ICC to exert 
jurisdiction over citizens of States that did not ratify the Statute and interferes with 
the sovereignty of non-party States.94  Furthermore, the United States read the Rome 
Statute as allowing the ICC to reassert jurisdiction over a defendant that has been 
tried by a national court when the ICC does not agree with the outcome of the 
proceeding.95  However, the Rome Statute and the existing basis of international 
jurisdiction expose the weaknesses in the United States’ jurisdictional arguments in 
refusing to ratify the Rome Statute.  
                                                                
92See generally US bilateral "non-surrender" agreements regarding the International 
Criminal Court, M2 Presswire, Oct. 1, 2002, 2002 WL 26803083 (on file with author). 
93See generally European Council’s External Relations (Provisional Version) 12134/02, 
Sept. 30, 2002 (on file with author). 
94See generally Grossman, supra note 27.  U.S. concerns are based on the ICC exerting its 
jurisdiction over U.S. military members or U.S. government officials over authorized military 
actions.  Id.
95See generally Press Briefing by Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for 
War Crimes Issues, in London, England (Sept. 20, 2002), at http://www.uspolicy.be/issues/ 
icc/prosper.092402.htm (last visited Jan 12, 2003) (on file with author).  
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a.  The International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction Does Not Interfere  
with State Sovereignty 
The United States’ assertion that the Rome Statute interferes with U.S. 
sovereignty is baseless.  First, the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited in the 
types of criminal cases that it can investigate or prosecute; those crimes are 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. 96
Furthermore, the Rome Statute provides that the ICC can exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a non-party State citizen without the State of nationality’s consent 
in only the following three situations: 1) if the citizen commits a crime on the 
territory of a party State, 2) if the citizen commits a crime on the territory of a non-
party State that accepts ICC jurisdiction or 3) if the United Nations Security Council 
refers a case to the ICC under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.97
For example, because the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC 
can only exert jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen, without U.S. consent, if the U.S. 
citizen commits a crime in a country that is a member of the Rome Statute or has 
accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction.  However, if the U.S. citizen returns to the United 
States after commission of a crime, the United States has no obligation to cooperate 
with the ICC and extradite the suspect.98  Simply stated, the eighty-seven ratifying 
countries have decided that specified crimes committed on their soil will be referred 
to the ICC for investigation and prosecution.  The Rome Statute does not claim 
“universal jurisdiction,” whereby it could investigate or prosecute crimes committed 
anywhere in the world without regard to the perpetrator’s citizenship and regardless 
of whether a country ratified the Rome Statute.99  It should be noted with curiosity 
that while the United States objects to the ICC’s limited jurisdiction, the United 
States is a ratifying party to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons In Time of War, whose provisions allow the United States to 
exercise “universal jurisdiction” for atrocities committed against civilians. 100
                                                                
96See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 5.  The crime of aggression has not been defined 
by the Statute. Therefore, the ICC cannot exert jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until 
it is defined and properly adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.  Id. at art 5(2). 
97Compare Rome Statute, supra note 26, at arts. 12(2)(a) and 13(b), with Int'l Shoe v. 
State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  Except for the referral of a case to the ICC by the 
United Nations Security Council, the Rome Statute’s personal jurisdiction can be compared to 
the “minimum contacts” doctrine set forth in Int’l Shoe,  326 U.S. 310. 
98See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 89(1).  Article 89 clearly states the court may 
“request” the cooperation of any State where the person may be found in order to obtain the 
arrest and surrender of the person.  The ICC has no mechanisms in place to force or compel 
the “requested” country (i.e. the United States) to cooperate.  Id. 
99 See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (defining 
“universal jurisdiction” as a country’s exertion of jurisdiction over an individual who 
committed a crime so universally condemned that any country in custody of the perpetrator 
could punish him according to their laws despite the fact the criminal activity occurring 
outside that country’s territory); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§§ 404, 423 (1987). 
100See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://193.194.138.190/html/ 
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Therefore, it is inconsistent, if not hypocritical, for the United States to object to the 
ICC’s limited jurisdiction for crimes that the United States could exercise 
“universal” jurisdiction over (under the provisions of the Geneva Convention).  
However, the United States responds to the ICC’s limited jurisdiction by maintaining 
that the Rome Statute interferes with U.S. sovereignty because the United States has 
never recognized an international organization’s right to prosecute U.S. citizens 
without obtaining U.S. consent prior to the prosecution.101
The argument that the Rome Statute interferes with U.S. sovereignty simply 
cannot be supported by accepted principles of law.  While it may be accurate that the 
United States has never recognized the right of an international organization to 
prosecute a U.S. citizen, international law recognizes a State’s right to prosecute 
foreign citizens who commit crimes within that State’s borders under the doctrine of 
territoriality.102  In fact, U.S. employment of the territoriality doctrine is evident by 
the United States’ prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen charged in 
the United States for his involvement in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the United States.103  Given that a country has the right to prosecute foreign nationals 
for crimes committed within its borders, the fact that the country may utilize a 
judicial forum not favored by the United States simply cannot be seen as an 
interference with the sovereignty of the United States.  
Furthermore, evidence of the Rome Statute’s respect for national sovereignty can 
be found within the Statute itself.  Respect for State sovereignty is apparent in the 
concept of complementarity, whereby the ICC would defer an investigation or 
prosecution of a crime to national courts.104  Article seventeen of the Rome Statute 
clearly states the ICC would find a case to be inadmissible to ICC jurisdiction if the 
                                                          
menu3/b/92.htm (last visited Jan 12, 2003) [hereinafter Geneva Convention].  With regard to 
the crimes specified in the Treaty, the second paragraph states: 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, 
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It 
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, 
hand such persons over for trial to another.  
Id. (emphasis added).  See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, supra note 14, at art. 6. 
101See generally Grossman, supra note 27.   
102See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1)(a) (1987) (providing 
that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to conduct that . . . takes place 
within its territory . . . .”) (this principle is referred to as territoriality and is the most common 
basis for exercising jurisdiction to prescribe an activity within a State’s borders); see also id. at
§ 421(2)(a) (allowing “a state’s exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a person, . 
. . is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted; the person . . . is present in the territory 
of the state,. . . .”).  The territoriality principle allows a State to exert criminal jurisdiction if 
the offense was committed within the forum State.  Id.
103 See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01-455-A, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm (last visited Jan 12, 2003) (stating that 
Moussaoui’s indictment is based on conspiracy to commit terrorist acts within the borders of 
the United States) (on file with author). 
104See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 17(1)(a),(b),(c).  
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case were investigated or prosecuted by a State having jurisdiction over it.105  In 
addition, the ICC would only exert jurisdiction if the State were “unwilling or unable 
to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.”106  Consequently, the Rome 
Statue actually encourages the investigation and prosecution by the State of 
nationality rather than through the ICC.  The Rome Statute accomplishes this by 
directing the Prosecutor to notify all States having jurisdiction over a crime for every 
case referred to the ICC or initiated by the ICC Prosecutor.107  Moreover, the Rome 
Statute provides that if the State of nationality informs the ICC that it is investigating 
its own citizen and requests jurisdiction over the crime specified, the Prosecutor must
defer the case to the requesting State.108  By allowing States the opportunity to 
undertake investigations and prosecutions over their citizens who have committed 
crimes on foreign soil, the Rome Statute can hardly be characterized as infringing on 
State sovereignty.  
An examination of the Rome Statue reveals that indeed the ICC has the potential 
to exercise jurisdiction over citizens of States that have not ratified the Statute.  
However, the ICC’s limited subject matter and personal jurisdiction along with the 
Rome Statute’s deferral of cases to national courts nullify the U.S. contention that 
the Statute binds non-member States and thereby threatens their sovereignty.  The 
Rome Statute’s articles and the ratifying members of the ICC insure the sovereignty 
of States that refrain from perpetrating atrocities on civilians and abide by 
international laws that respect human rights.  Furthermore, the United States is not 
refusing to ratify the Rome Statute because the U.S. would find it offensive to be a 
party to a treaty that exerted jurisdiction over citizens of non-member States.109
Exactly the contrary is true.  The United States is concerned simply because it is not 
a member of the ICC and therefore, future conflicts involving the U.S. could expose 
U.S. soldiers and senior officials to ICC prosecution if atrocities are committed 
during those conflicts.  Therefore, it is inaccurate for the United States to attempt to 
justify its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute based on the fact that the ICC can exert 
jurisdiction over citizens of a non-party States.   
                                                                
105Id. at art. 17(1).  A State would have jurisdiction over a case if a crime was committed 
within its borders or one of its citizens committed the crime specified by the Rome Statute.  Id.
at art. 12(2)(a).
106Id. at art. 17(2), (3).  The Statute goes on to define “unwillingness” in Article 17(2), and 
“inability” in Article 17(3). 
107Id. at art. 18(1) (stating the “prosecutor shall notify all State Parties and those States 
which . . . would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes . . . .”) (emphasis added).  A 
case referred to the ICC through the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter will not be deferred to the State of Nationality.  However, this should not 
impinge on U.S. sovereignty because the United States is a permanent member of the Security 
Council and could veto any referral to the ICC.  See U.N. Charter, supra note 52. 
108Id. at art. 18(2) (stating “[A] State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has 
investigated its nationals . . . [a]t the request of that state, the Prosecutor shall defer to the 
State’s investigation . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
109See Geneva Convention, supra note 100, at art. 146.  The United States is already a 
member the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of 
War, a treaty that actually allows countries to exert jurisdiction over non-member citizens.  
See generally id.
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b.  Reassertion of Jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court After a  
Trial by a National Court System 
The United States also objects to the ICC because it believes the ICC could 
reassert jurisdiction over a case that has already been tried in a national court.110  The 
United States’ concern is focused on the situation whereby a suspect is either 
investigated or prosecuted by a national court and is acquitted of the crime specified 
by the ICC.  The United States fears the possibility of “double jeopardy” if the ICC 
disagrees with the outcome of an investigation or a trial by a national court and 
attempts to reassert jurisdiction over the case in order to prosecute the accused a 
second time.111   However, the Rome Statute directly addresses the United States’ 
concern over the ICC’s ability to reassert jurisdiction and illustrates that those 
concerns are without merit. 
First, under Article 20(3), the Rome Statute expressly provides that any person 
who has been tried in a national court for crimes specified under Articles 6, 7 or 8 of 
the Rome Statute will not be tried by the ICC for the conduct that gave rise to those 
crimes.112  In effect, this is the Rome Statute’s prohibition against ICC prosecution of 
a suspect following a national court trial; no “double jeopardy” is permitted under 
the Rome Statute.  Furthermore, Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides that the 
case becomes inadmissible to the ICC if the State having jurisdiction over the case 
has investigated and decided not to prosecute, as long as its decision is not due to an 
“unwillingness” or “inability” to prosecute.113  In addition, Article 17 states that a 
case is inadmissible to the ICC where a defendant has already been prosecuted by a 
national court for a Rome Statute violation.114  Consequently, in order to read Article 
20(3) and 17 consistently, the Rome Statute’s prohibition against “double jeopardy” 
must also apply if the national court acquits the accused of the crimes specified.  
Therefore, the ICC could not re-exert jurisdiction over the case after a national trial 
and the question of “double jeopardy” is avoided. 
The actual United States concern stems from the two qualifications to the 
prohibition against “double jeopardy.”  The Rome Statue provides that the ICC can 
assert jurisdiction and prosecute a suspect after a national court trial if: 1) the 
national court proceedings were for the purpose of shielding the accused from 
                                                                
110See generally Prosper Press Briefing, supra note 95.   
111Id.
112See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 20(3).  Article 20(3) refers to Articles 6, 7, and 
8 in the provision.  Article 6 defines and states the elements necessary for the crime of 
“genocide;”  Article 7 defines and states the elements necessary for “crimes against 
humanity;” and Article 8 defines and states the elements necessary for “war crimes.” 
113Id. at art. 17(1)(b).  The language of Article 17 clearly indicates that if a good-faith 
investigation results in a decision not to prosecute and if the decision was not an attempt to 
shield the accused from being brought to justice, the decision not to prosecute would make the 
case inadmissible to the ICC.  Therefore, the ICC could not re-exert jurisdiction over the case 
and the question of “double jeopardy” is avoided.  Articles 17(2) and 17(3) define 
“unwillingness” and “inability,” which the ICC prosecutor would have to prove to the justices 
of the ICC prior to any attempts to re-exert ICC jurisdiction over a case. 
114Id. at art. 17(1)(c).  This paragraph of the Rome Statute specifically mentions Article 
20(3) and its prohibition against “double jeopardy.” 
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criminal responsibility for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC115 or 2) the 
national court proceedings were not done impartially or independently in accordance 
with due process and were conducted in a manner inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the accused to justice.116  The two exceptions were enacted to prevent a State from 
requesting jurisdiction from the ICC in order to prosecute one of its citizens and then 
either declining to prosecute or conducting a sham prosecution for the purpose of 
providing impunity for the accused.117  However, under a situation enumerated by the 
two exceptions, the accused is never actually exposed to a valid prosecution by the 
national court system; therefore, no “double jeopardy” truly exists if the ICC 
reasserts its jurisdiction and prosecutes the accused.   
The United States is concerned the ICC may attempt to employ one of the two 
exceptions and reassert jurisdiction over a case after a U.S. investigation found no 
basis for a trial or after a trial in which the accused was acquitted.  Considering the 
respected reputation of the courts of the United States, this would be a dangerous 
path for the ICC to take for several reasons.  First, the judicial branch of the United 
States functions independently from the executive and legislative branches of the 
government.118  In order to achieve a fair trial, it is imperative that the judicial branch 
not be influenced by the political will of the remaining branches of government.  The 
entire justice system of the United States is based upon the independence of the 
judiciary, ostensibly assuring the citizens of the United States a fair and impartial 
trial by the national courts of the United States.  Secondly, criminal prosecutions in 
the United States are generally conducted in a public forum.119  Since prosecutions 
are conducted in public, opportunity exists for intense scrutiny over trials to ensure 
the veracity of the prosecution.  The United States can pride itself on having an 
                                                                
115Id. at art. 20(3)(a). 
116Id. at art. 20(3)(b). 
117A State could gain jurisdiction over an ICC case in one of two ways.  First, the State 
may employ the Rome Statute’s concept of “complementarity,” found in Article 17, if the 
State is in custody of the suspect and makes its intention to investigate or prosecute known to 
the ICC.  See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 17.  Or secondly, if a case were already 
referred to the ICC, the State could gain jurisdiction over the case under Article 18(2) by 
notifying the ICC that it is investigating or has investigated the case.  Id. at 18(2).  Under 
Article 18(2) the ICC Prosecutor must defer to the State’s investigation.  Id.
118See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may  . . . establish.”); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party; . . . and between a 
State, or citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”); see, e.g., Phil Hirschkorn, 
Judge grants Moussaoui access to key detainee, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/02/ 
moussaoui/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (on file with author).  An example of the 
independence of U.S. courts apart from the Executive branch of the government can be seen in 
the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui.  The federal judge in the Moussaoui case has granted 
Moussaoui access to the alleged ringleader of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks despite the 
objections of the U.S. government.  Id. Although prosecution of Moussaoui is an emotionally 
charged prosecution, the U.S. courts will not yield to the political will of the U.S. prosecution 
and insists on adhering to the rule of law.  Id. 
119See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, . . . . ”).  
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independent criminal justice system.  Consequently, it would be difficult to envision 
any U.S. court participating in a sham trial for the purpose of shielding a U.S. 
defendant from prosecution or justice.  Participation by a U.S. court in a proceeding 
that could legitimately be characterized as a “sham” would denigrate the trust and 
reputation of U.S. courts in the eyes of U.S. citizens and the rest of the world.  A 
global perception of U.S. courts as disreputable is a heavy price to pay in light of the 
potential future prosecution of foreign terrorists by U.S. courts or U.S. military 
commissions and the present criminal prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui. 120
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that U.S. courts would undertake a criminal 
prosecution of a defendant accused of violating the Rome Statute with anything less 
than an independent and legitimate prosecution and adjudication in accord with due 
process of the law and the Constitution of the United States. 
Furthermore, in order for the ICC Prosecutor to challenge a U.S. court 
proceeding under Article 20(3), he must prove the U.S. trial was conducted for the 
purpose of shielding the defendant from criminal responsibility or that the trial was 
not conducted with the intent to bring the defendant to justice. 121   If the ICC 
Prosecutor could not accomplish this and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber of Judges 
proceeded to reassert jurisdiction over a case previously tried by a national court, the 
United States would have the right to appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC.122  Naturally, the Appeals Chamber is composed of 
entirely different Judges than those on the Pre-Trial Chamber and those justices 
would have to agree with the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber.  Moreover, if the 
Pre-Trial Chamber approved the reassertion of jurisdiction without establishing the 
U.S. trial was a “sham,” the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Judges could be subject to 
removal from office under the Rome Statute for allowing the reassertion of 
jurisdiction to proceed. 123   Most importantly, if the ICC reasserts jurisdiction 
                                                                
120See generally U.S. Seeks Delay in Moussaoui Case, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 8, 
2003, at A4; see also Joanne Mariner, A Fair Trial for Zacarias Moussaoui, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/03/findlaw.analysis.mariner.moussaoui/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2003) (on file with author).  Alleged Sept. 11th terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui has 
stated that alleged Sept. 11th terrorist ringleader Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s testimony could 
exonerate him and has requested access to the ringleader.  Id.  In response, the U.S. 
government maintains the Moussaoui trial may introduce national secrets into evidence and 
therefore may drop the federal prosecution in favor of conducting a secret military tribunal.  
Id. Oddly enough the act of moving a trial from an open forum to a secret military tribunal 
may raise doubt about the U.S. justice system’s impartiality.  Id. The act of moving the 
Moussaoui trial to a U.S. military tribunal could also be used to justify the contention that the 
United States judicial system was no less an unchecked political system than that of the ICC.  
However, while the U.S. government has the luxury of dropping its case against Moussaoui 
and pursuing it in a military tribunal, the ICC does not have such an option.  See generally 
Rome Statute, supra note 26.  The ICC’s option is limited to holding certain proceedings in 
closed sessions in order to protect confidential or sensitive material.  See Rome Statute, supra
note 26, at art. 64(7). 
121See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 20(3)(a), (b).    
122Id. at art. 18(4). 
123Compare Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 46 with U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.  This 
article of the Rome Statute is comparable to the impeachment power of the House of 
Representatives and removal power of the Senate over federal court judges as prescribed by 
the U.S. Constitution.  Id. 
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following a national court proceeding without conclusively establishing a sham 
national trial, the ICC risks the ability to develop trust and confidence among Rome 
Statute member States.  The ICC’s reassertion of jurisdiction in that situation would 
illustrate to ICC member States that complementarity does not actually exist in the 
Rome Statute.  That fact alone should be enough to convince America’s European 
allies that the ICC is indeed as flawed as the United States suggests and would 
facilitate their withdrawal from the Rome Statute, which ultimately would mean the 
failure of the ICC.124  Just as it would be imprudent for a U.S. court to participate in a 
sham trial, it would be unwise for the ICC to reassert jurisdiction following a 
national trial without irrefutable evidence the trial was undertaken to shield the 
defendant from criminal responsibility or avoid bringing the defendant to justice. 
The independence of U.S. courts protects against manipulation by the executive 
and legislative branches of the U.S. government and provides a system based on the 
application of law rather than the political will of the government.  That 
independence makes U.S. courts an unlikely forum for a sham prosecution.  
Consequently, a case adjudicated by an independent U.S. court should preclude the 
ICC from contending that the trial was conducted for the purpose of shielding a 
defendant from criminal responsibility or as an effort to avoid bringing the defendant 
to justice.  However, if the ICC attempted to reassert jurisdiction over a trial 
conducted in the United States, the ICC would have to conclusively prove the U.S. 
trial was a “sham.”  Without conclusive proof of a sham trial prior to reasserting 
jurisdiction, the ICC risks exposing itself to criticism which inhibits building 
confidence in the concept of complementarity and the ICC itself.   
In conclusion, the combined burden of conclusively establishing a sham trial and 
the risk of criticism upon a newly formed court that desires international confidence 
should prevent the ICC from reasserting jurisdiction over a case previously 
adjudicated by a U.S. court. 
2.  The Rome Statute Provides Sufficient Checks Over the International  
Criminal Court 
The United States maintains that it has U.S. military forces in over 100 nations 
around the globe in various activities ranging from humanitarian operations, 
peacekeeping, and fighting against terrorism.125  The United States contends this 
worldwide deployment of U.S. troops exposes the United States to politically 
motivated prosecution by the ICC.126  The United States argues that the Rome Statute 
has created an unchecked court that allows for politically motivated prosecutions of 
U.S. officials and servicemen. 127   While it is true the ICC does not have the 
traditional checks and balances associated with the judicial system of the United 
States, there are sufficient checks contained within the Rome Statute to invalidate the 
United States’ argument that the ICC could pursue politically motivated 
prosecutions. 
                                                                
124See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 127.   Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides 
for the withdrawal of a member State from the Rome Statute.  Presumably, a member State 
could withdraw for any reason.  Id. 
125See generally Grossman, supra note 27.  
126Id.
127Id.
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The Rome Statute’s Articles contain a number of checks on the ICC Prosecutor 
that deter politically motivated investigations or prosecutions.  The first check on the 
ICC Prosecutor is the Court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction.128  The ICC and the 
Prosecutor have jurisdiction over only four crimes, of which only three are actually 
prosecutable since “aggression” has yet to be defined.129  However, the Rome Statute 
goes further and institutes a check on the power of the Prosecutor to initiate 
investigations. 130   In order for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation into a 
situation of his own volition, the Prosecutor must obtain the permission of the Pre-
Trial Chamber.131  As with the Prosecutor, all of the ICC judges must possess the 
highest moral character, impartiality, and integrity as well as be qualified for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices of their States.132  Moreover, the Rome 
Statute requires that none of the eighteen judges elected to the ICC be from the same 
State.133  The Pre-Trial Chamber consists of a pool of six judges with criminal trial 
experience; three of the six judges will hear investigation requests brought before the 
Pre-Trial Chamber by the Prosecutor.134  Furthermore, approval for the Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation requires that two of the three Pre-Trial judges approve the 
investigation.135  The judges may refuse the Prosecutor’s request 136 or they may 
approve the commencement of an investigation and reserve the right to refuse 
                                                                
128See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 5.  The ICC has jurisdiction over the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  Id.  Furthermore, the ICC’s personal 
jurisdiction is limited to those crimes committed on a member State’s soil, by member State 
citizens, or referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council.  See id. at arts. 12(2)(a), 12 
(2)(b), 13(b). 
129See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 5(2).  Not only is the crime of aggression not 
defined by the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute provides that the definition must be consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations.  Id.  Moreover, the crime of aggression cannot be 
incorporated into the Rome Statute until seven years after the date the Statute entered into 
force. See id. at arts. 5(2), 121. 
130 Id. at art. 42(3).  The Rome Statute requires the Prosecutor to be of high moral 
character, highly competent, and experienced in the prosecution of criminal cases.  Id.
131 Id. at art. 15(3) (stating that once the Prosecutor has determined that there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he shall submit the material supporting his 
belief to the Pre-Trial Chamber and request authorization for an investigation). 
132Id. at art. 36(3)(a). 
133Id. at art. 36(7).  The requirement that no two judges come from the same State 
ostensibly lessens the possibility of similar political views and helps reduce the possibility of 
politically motivated investigations or prosecutions. 
134See Rome Statute, supra note 26.  Article 39(1) of the Statute states the Pre-Trial 
Chamber will be composed of six judges with predominately criminal trial experience.   
135See generally Rome Statute, supra note 26.  Article 39(2)(b)(ii) and 57(2)(a) combine to 
provide that three Pre-Trial Chamber judges must hear the initiation of investigation request of 
the Prosecutor.  Article 57(2)(a) sets out the requirement that two of the three judges must 
concur in the request for initiation of an investigation. 
136See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 15(5).  A refusal to permit an investigation does 
not preclude the Prosecutor from future requests for the same case if more information 
becomes available to the Prosecutor.  Id.
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jurisdiction or admissibility over the case at a future time.137  It may be possible for a 
Prosecutor to request an investigation based on political motivations.  However, it is 
highly improbable that three judges of high moral character and integrity, from 
diverse backgrounds, would share the same political motivation or permit the 
initiation of an investigation without sufficient supporting evidence.  Lastly, as 
mentioned previously, both the Prosecutor and ICC judges are subject to removal 
from office by the member States for serious misconduct or serious breaches of their 
duties. 138   The limited subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, the approval 
requirement of the Pre-Trial Chamber prior to investigation initiation, the 
qualifications necessary to become an ICC prosecutor and the possibility of removal 
from office should be more than sufficient to deter politically motivated prosecutions 
of U.S. troops or citizens. 
Additionally, the Rome Statute has checks on cases referred to the ICC by 
member States and for cases resulting from approved prosecutorial investigations.  
First, for cases resulting from member State referral or prosecutorial investigation, 
the Prosecutor must notify all member State parties and non-member State parties 
that would normally have jurisdiction over the crime. 139   The Prosecutor must 
provide all of the States with information and evidence regarding the crime, provided 
the evidence does not jeopardize witnesses, other evidence, or the apprehension of 
the suspect(s).140  Second, a State has one month in which to notify the ICC that it is 
investigating or has completed its investigation into the crime and request 
jurisdiction over the case.141  In the event that a State requests jurisdiction over a 
case, the Prosecutor must defer to the State’s investigation unless the Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorizes an ICC investigation upon application from the Prosecutor.142
Third, any decision made by the Pre-Trial Chamber with regards to jurisdiction may 
be appealed by a State to the Appeals Chamber. 143   The Appeals Chamber is 
composed of five judges who will serve on the Appeals Chamber their entire terms 
and shall be distinct from the Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber judges.144  The decision of 
the Appeals Chamber must be by a majority of the judges and the judgment of the 
Chamber must state the reasons on which the decision was based and be delivered in 
open court.145  When unanimity among the Appeals Chamber is not present, the 
                                                                
137Id. at art. 15(4).  The Pre-Trial Chamber would refuse the case if the evidence was 
lacking.  Id.
138Id. at art. 46(2).  A Prosecutor may be removed from office by an absolute majority vote 
of the member States.  Id. at art. 46(2)(b).  Whereas an ICC judge may be removed upon a 
two-thirds majority vote by the member States.  Id. at art. 46(2)(a). 
139Id. at art. 18(1).  
140Id.
141See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 18(2). 
142Id.  Article 18(2) states that upon request of the State, the prosecutor shall defer to the 
State’s investigation.  
143Id. at art. 18(4). 
144Id. at art. 39(3)(b). 
145Id. at art. 83(4). 
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views of both the majority and minority must be published as well as any separate or 
dissenting opinion.146
Furthermore, the Rome Statute provides several checks on the ICC’s judicial 
system for cases referred to the ICC by member States or the Prosecutor.  Once 
again, the Prosecutor is required to notify any State with jurisdiction over the case 
that a case has been referred to the ICC and must provide the evidence that gave rise 
to the case.147  Yet again, in response to the notification, States have the option of 
requesting jurisdiction over the case. 148   Once a State has requested to take 
jurisdiction of the case from the ICC, the Prosecutor must defer jurisdiction to the 
requesting State. 149   The only possible impediment to a State’s request for 
jurisdiction is the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, which could deny the State’s 
request.150  The United States could plausibly contend that a Prosecutor is politically 
motivated in bringing a case to the ICC and may even attempt to suggest the Pre-
Trial judges share the same political motivation as the Prosecutor if they were to 
deny the U.S. jurisdiction.  However, it would be a difficult proposition to support 
that the ICC Prosecutor, along with at least two Pre-Trial Judges, and at least three 
Appeals Judges, share enough common political motivation to permit a politically 
motivated prosecution to proceed without justification.  The possibility that six 
individuals from diverse backgrounds, cultures, and areas of the globe would share 
the same political view is tenuous at best.  Admittedly, while the checks on the ICC’s 
jurisdiction may not be identical to those imposed on the courts of the United States, 
the mechanisms in place which verify proper and justified prosecutions seem 
adequate to defeat the U.S. claim that the ICC is an unchecked Court. 
Additionally, the Rome Statute supplies an external check on the ICC through the 
United Nations Security Council.  The Rome Statute provides that the United 
Nations Security Council may prevent an ICC investigation or prosecution by 
passing a Security Council resolution deferring the investigation or prosecution.151
Once the Security Council passes the resolution, the ICC may not commence an 
investigation or prosecution for a period of twelve months.152  The Security Council 
may continue to defer the investigation or prosecution by renewing the resolution 
after the expiration of the twelve-month period.153  This provision may be used by 
the Security Council to protect military forces engaged in United Nations approved 
                                                                
146Id.
147Id. at art. 18(1). 
148Id. at art. 18(2). 
149Id.
150Id. at arts. 18(2), 18(4).  The ICC prosecutor could petition the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
deny deferring jurisdiction to the State, however any decision to deny jurisdiction by the Pre-
Trial Chamber could be brought before the Appeals Chamber of the ICC for review.  Id. at art. 
18(4).  Any Pre-Trial Chamber denial of jurisdiction would require the utmost justification in 
order to avoid defeating the ICC’s concept of complementarity and to bolster the trust and 
faith in the ICC as an institution of law instead of a political body.  
151See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 16.   
152Id.
153Id.
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military operations such as those deployed in the Gulf War and in the aftermath of 
the Yugoslav breakup.  While the Security Council deferral provision would seem to 
be the type of check on the ICC that the United States would welcome, exactly the 
opposite is true.  During the conference in Rome, the United States lobbied the 
conference members against the creation of an independent court and prosecutor.154
Instead, the United States advocated the creation of a court that depended upon the 
United Nations Security Council to grant it jurisdiction over cases.   Although this 
seems like a subtle difference, in actuality it created an enormous chasm between the 
United States and the Rome Statute member States which ultimately contributed to 
the United States “unsigning” the Rome Statute.  The Rome Statute created a court 
that forces the Security Council to act in order to defer a case from ICC jurisdiction 
rather than having to act in order to confer jurisdiction upon the ICC.  The United 
States contends the difference between deferring and conferring jurisdiction leads to 
politicized prosecutions.155  However, had the Rome conference members adopted a 
court controlled by the United Nations Security Council, all ICC prosecutions and 
investigations would have required a unanimous vote of the Security Council’s 
permanent members prior to commencement.  Considering the political nature of the 
United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, the ICC would be rendered 
ineffective if it were to depend on the permanent members of the Security Council to 
unanimously agree on ICC jurisdiction.  With U.S. troops deployed around the 
world, it is more likely the United States did not relish the prospect of convincing the 
other permanent members of the Security Council to defer jurisdiction in the event 
that U.S. personnel were brought before the ICC.   
While the ICC’s Security Council deferral provision may not be the check the 
United States hoped to achieve at the Rome conference, nonetheless, it is a method 
that guarantees protection for military personnel engaged in United Nations 
operations.  Therefore, the United States contention that the ICC is an unchecked 
power cannot be sustained given the Rome Statute’s allowance for a Security 
Council deferral of ICC investigations and prosecutions.      
3.  The Rome Statute is Obligated to Respect the Constitutional Rights  
of U.S. Citizens 
The United States contends that the ICC has no obligation to respect the 
Constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.156  That contention is absolutely without merit, 
the Rome Statute contains virtually every Constitutional right afforded a citizen of 
the United States.   
The following chart compares the rights derived from the Constitution of the 
United States with the rights afforded the accused by the Rome Statute: 
                                                                
154See Grossman, supra note 27. 
155Id.
156See American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7421(7) (2002); see also
Press Release, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/b05062002_bt233-02.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2003) (on file with author).  
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Table: Comparison of U.S. Constitutional Rights vs. Rome Statute Rights157
Constitutional Rights U.S. Constitution  Rome Statute 
Presumption of Innocence Presumption of innocence in 
favor of the accused. 
Coffin v. United States, 156 US 
432, 453 (1895). 
“Everyone shall be 
presumed to be innocent 
until proven guilty before 
the Court…” 
(Art. 66(1)) 
Constitutional Rights U.S. Constitution  Rome Statute 
Speedy and Public Trial “In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public 
trial…”
(Amend. VI) 
“…the accused shall be 
entitled to a public 
hearing…”
(Art. 67(1)) 
“…the accused shall be 
entitled…to be tried 
without undue delay…” 
(Art. 67(1)(c)) 
Assistance of Counsel “In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the 
right…to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defense.” 
(Amend. VI) 
“…the accused shall be 
entitled…to communicate 
freely with counsel of the 
accused’s choosing…” 
(Art. 67(1)(b)) 
“…the accused shall be 
entitled…to have legal 
assistance assigned by the 
Court where the interests 
of justice so require, and 
without payment if the 
accused lacks sufficient 
means to pay for it…” 
(Art. 67(1)(d)) 
Right to Remain Silent and 
Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination 
“No person…shall be 
compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against 
himself….” 
(Amend. V) 
“…the accused shall be 
entitled…not to be 
compelled to testify …and 
to remain silent, without 
such silence being a 
consideration in the 
determination of guilt or 
innocence.…”
(Art. 67(1)(g)) 
                                                                
157See generally Monroe Leigh, Compatibility of the United States Constitution and the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/ 
factsheets/iccusconst.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) (on file with author). Table compiled by 
Monroe Leigh of the American Bar Association. 
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Right to Written Statement 
of Charges 
“In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the 
right…to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the 
accusation….”
(Amend. VI) 
“…the person shall be 
provided with a copy of 
the…charges….”
(Art. 61(3)) 
Right to Examine Adverse 
Witnesses 
“In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the 
right…to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him….” 
(Amend. VI) 
“…the accused shall be 
entitled…to examine, or to 
have examined…the 
witnesses against him or 
her…” 
(Art. 67(1)(e)) 
Right to Obtain Witnesses “In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the 
right…to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor….” 
(Amend. VI) 
“…the accused shall be 
entitled…to obtain the 
attendance and 
examination of witnesses 
on his or her behalf….” 
(Art. 67(1)(e)) 
Prohibition Against Ex-Post 
Facto Crimes 
“No Bill of Attainder or ex post 
facto law shall be passed.” 
(U.S. Const. art. I., § 9, cl. 3) 
“A person shall not be 
criminally responsible 
under this Statute unless 
the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it 
takes place, a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the 
Court.” 
(Art. 22(1)) 
Prohibition Against Double 
Jeopardy 
“…nor shall a person be 
subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb…” 
(Amend. V) 
“No person who has been 
tried by another 
court…tried by the Court 
with respect to the same 
conduct….” 
(Art. 20(3)) 
Constitutional Rights U.S. Constitution  Rome Statute 
Freedom from Warrantless 
Arrest and Searches 
“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause…” 
(Amend. IV) 
“…the Pre-trial Chamber 
may…issue…warrants as 
may be required….” 
(Art. 57(3)(a)) 
The Pre-Trail Chamber 
shall issue a warrant if “it 
is satisfied that…[t]here 
are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person has 
committed a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the 
Court and the arrest of the 
person appears 
necessary….”(Art. 58) 
Prohibition Against Trials in 
Absentia
The language, history, and 
logic of Rule 43 support a 
straightforward interpretation 
that prohibits the trial in 
absentia of a defendant who is 
not present at the beginning of 
the trial. 
Crosby v. United States, 506 
U.S. 255, 262 (1993) 
“The accused shall be 
present during the trial.” 
(Art. 63) 
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Right to be Present at Trial “[O]ne of the most basic of the 
rights guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause is the 
accused’s right to be present in 
the courtroom at every stage of 
his trial.” 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
338 (1970) (citing Lewis v. 
United States, 146 U.S. 370 
(1892)) 
When defendant knowingly 
absents himself from court 
during trial, court may 
“proceed with trial in like 
manner and with like effect as 
if he were present.” 
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 
442, 455 (1912) 
“The accused shall be 
present during the trial.” 
(Art. 63) 
“If the accused, being 
present before the Court, 
continues to disrupt the 
trial, the Trial Chamber 
may remove the 
accused...[s]uch measures 
shall be taken only in 
exceptional circumstances 
after…. 
(Art. 63(2)) 
Exclusion of Illegally 
Obtained Evidence 
“When evidence is obtained in 
violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the 
…exclusionary rule usually 
precludes its use … against the 
victim of the illegal search and 
seizure.”
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 
347 (1987) (citing Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961)) 
“Evidence obtained by 
means of a violation of this 
Statute or internationally 
recognized human rights 
shall not be admissible….” 
(Art. 69(7)) 
Additional trial rights common to U.S. criminal courts and the Rome Statute: 
U.S. Criminal Courts Rome Statute 
Burden of Proof in a 
Criminal Trial 
“The Fifth Amendment …and the 
Sixth,  that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, …have held that these 
provisions require criminal 
convictions to rest upon a jury 
determination that the defendant is 
guilty of every element of the crime 
with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
(Amend. V & VI); U.S. v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 509-10  (1995) (citing 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
277-78 (1993)) 
“In order to convict the 
accused, the Court must 
be convinced of the guilt 
of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt.” 
(Art. 66(3)) 
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Prosecution Must 
Provide Exculpatory 
Evidence
“…the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence  favorable 
to an accused upon request violates 
due process….” 
(Amend. V) 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963) 
“…the Prosecutor 
shall…  disclose to the 
defence evidence in the 
Prosecutor's possession 
or control which he or 
she believes shows or 
tends to show the 
innocence of the accused, 
or to mitigate the guilt of 
the accused, or which 
may affect the credibility 
of prosecution evidence.” 
(Art. 67(2)) 
Two significant differences exist between trials held in U.S. criminal courts and 
the ICC.  First, the ICC will determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence by the Trial 
Chamber judges whereas U.S. criminal courts employ a jury system to determine a 
defendant’s guilt.158  Second, a defendant in an ICC prosecution can be found guilty 
by a majority of the Trial Chamber’s judges as opposed to the requirement of 
unanimity in U.S. criminal cases.159  On the surface, citizens of the United States 
would have a difficult time reconciling a criminal trial conducted without a jury that 
allows a conviction in the absence of a unanimous verdict.  However, it should be 
noted that the ICC will function in exactly the same manner as the International 
Criminal Tribunals established by resolution of the United Nations Security Council.  
The Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals prosecute crimes of genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity; the very crimes the ICC will prosecute.  Trial judges 
instead of a jury adjudicate the cases heard by the Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals 
and a guilty verdict requires a majority vote of the trial judges.160  As a permanent 
member of the Security Council, the United States voted for the establishment of the 
Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals.  Therefore, the United States expressly approved 
of the absence of a jury and the conviction of a defendant by less than a unanimous 
verdict for trials that involved the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  Consequently, it is extremely illogical, from a legal perspective, for the 
United States to maintain that the ICC’s system of adjudication is somehow flawed, 
especially since the ICC mirrors the U.S. approved International Criminal Tribunal 
system.  However, considering that the ICC’s jurisdiction is not constrained to a 
specific conflict, as are the jurisdictions of the International Criminal Tribunals, 
perhaps the best arguments to support the contention that the ICC’s system of 
adjudication is flawed are political arguments rather than legal ones.   
Furthermore, the Bush administration has advocated prosecuting foreigners 
accused of terrorism by U.S. military tribunals as opposed to the criminal courts of 
the United States.161  The defendant’s rights in a U.S. military tribunal are impinged 
                                                                
158Compare Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 39(2)(b)(ii) with U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
159Compare Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 74(3) with Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 
740, 748 (1948) (stating “[u]nanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments apply.  In criminal cases this requirement of unanimity extends to all issues--
character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment--which are left to the jury”). 
160See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, supra note 19, at art. 23. 
161See generally Mariner, supra note 120. 
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upon to a greater extent than the ICC’s lack of a jury and conviction by a majority of 
the trial judges.  U.S. military tribunals will consist of a commission composed of 
military officers instead of a jury of the defendant’s peers.162  In addition, a U.S. 
military tribunal allows the introduction of evidence that would not be permitted by a 
civilian criminal court. For example, “chain of custody” of the evidence need not be 
established and secondhand evidence, along with hearsay evidence, will also be 
permitted.163  Moreover, a conviction by a U.S. military tribunal requires only a two-
thirds majority vote of the commission’s officers instead of a unanimous verdict.164
The U.S. military tribunal’s two-thirds majority conviction standard is consistent 
with the ICC’s conviction requirement.165  Most shocking of all is that President 
Bush’s Executive Order creating the U.S. military tribunals declared that the 
principles of law and rules of evidence generally recognized in civilian trials are “not 
practicable to apply” to the military commissions.166  By comparison, a trial by the 
ICC is far more respectful of a defendant’s Constitutional rights then a military 
tribunal.167
By comparing the rights afforded a defendant under the Rome Statute with those 
afforded by the U.S. Constitution, it is evident the Rome Statute provides all of the 
rights contained in the U.S. Constitution with the exception of a jury trial and a 
conviction by unanimous decision.  However, genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity can be equated to acts of terrorism in terms of their wanton 
disregard for human life.  By classifying those heinous crimes as affronts to 
humanity, the ICC’s lack of a jury trial and conviction by two-thirds majority can be 
reconciled with the United States’ use of military tribunals.  Furthermore, the ICC’s 
adjudicative procedure is consistent with that employed by the International Criminal 
Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, which the United States explicitly approved 
and ratified through its Security Council vote establishing the tribunals.  Having 
placed its stamp of approval on the procedures of the International Criminal 
Tribunals, it is hypocritical for the United States to label that same procedure, 
embodied by the ICC, as flawed and disrespectful of the rights of U.S. citizens.  If 
                                                                
162See Exec. Order No. 222, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) at § 4(C)(2) (providing 
for a military commission that will be both the trier of fact and law) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/20011113-27.html (last 
visited Feb 9, 2003) (on file with author).  The ICC’s panel of judges can be characterized as a 
civilian version of the military tribunal commission.  See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 26, at 
art. 39(2)(b)(ii) (trial chamber is composed of three judges). 
163See generally Exec. Order No. 222, supra note 162, at § 4(c)(3) (allowing admission of 
evidence that is of probative value as judged by the opinion of the presiding officer) (emphasis 
added).
164See id. at § 4(c)(6) (allowing a conviction by a two-thirds majority of the commission 
that is present at the time of voting).   
165Compare Exec. Order No. 222, supra note 162, at § 4(C)(6) (two-thirds majority of the 
commission members for conviction), with Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 74(3) (two of 
three Trial Chamber judges must vote to convict). 
166 See Exec. Order No. 222, supra note 162, at § 1(f) (emphasis added). 
167 See supra note 157 and accompanying charts in the text (showing that the ICC provides 
the defendant the same trial rights granted by the U.S. Constitution). 
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this were actually the case, the United States would be justified, if not obligated, to 
“unsign” the United Nations Security Council resolution that created the 
International Criminal Tribunals just as it “unsigned” the Rome Statute.  Taken as a 
whole, the ICC’s respect for U.S. Constitutional criminal trial rights and its 
procedural consistency with U.S. military tribunals and the International Criminal 
Tribunals clearly establish that the ICC is a system obligated to respect the 
Constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.   
IV. CONCLUSION: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND THE ROME STATUTE DO NOT SUPPORT 
THE UNITED STATES POSITION OPPOSING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The United States contends that the ICC’s jurisdiction interferes with national 
sovereignty, that the ICC can reassert its jurisdiction over a defendant following a 
national court trial, that there are no checks upon the ICC to prevent politically 
motivated prosecutions, and that the ICC does not respect the Constitutional rights of 
U.S. citizens.  If the legal arguments were accurate, the United States would be 
justified in rejecting the ICC.  However, the arguments posed by the United States do 
not find support in the Rome Statute and consequently do not justify the United 
States’ position against the ICC.  
The ICC’s jurisdiction does not interfere with the sovereignty of the United 
States.  The Rome Statute’s provisions impart national priority over cases and 
investigations through the concept of complementarity.168  Additionally, the Rome 
Statute provides that the ICC is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction, 
concerning itself with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity169 and 
bases its personal jurisdiction over defendants on the international law principle of 
territoriality, which the United States has employed in the past and is employing in it 
prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui.170  By recognizing the priority of the United 
States to try cases in its own courts, the ICC is respectful of national sovereignty as 
opposed to interfering with sovereignty. 
The United States is correct when it states that the Rome Statute provides for the 
ICC to reassert jurisdiction over a defendant following a national trial.  However, 
first and foremost the Rome Statute expressly prohibits double jeopardy.171  Second, 
jurisdiction reassertion by the ICC is applicable only in cases where a national 
prosecution was a sham trial, undertaken to shield a defendant from criminal 
responsibility or performed in a manner inconsistent with the intent to bring the 
perpetrator to justice.172  The public prosecution of U.S. criminal trials173 and the 
independence of U.S. courts from the executive and legislative branches of the 
                                                                
168See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 17. 
169See id. at art. 5. 
170See id. at art. 12; see, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (S.D. Fla. 
1990) (finding U.S. jurisdiction based on extraterritorial actions with deleterious effects within 
the United States). 
171See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 20.   
172Id.
173See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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government, 174  give little opportunity or justification for the ICC to reassert 
jurisdiction following a U.S. trial.  Finally, in order to reinforce complementarity and 
avoid the suggestion of a politicized prosecution, the ICC would have to do more 
than suggest that a national trial was a sham.  Prior to reasserting jurisdiction, the 
ICC Prosecutor must provide proof a national trial was conducted for the purpose of
shielding the defendant or conducted inconsistent with the intent of bringing the 
defendant to justice.  In summation, the ICC’s ability to reassert jurisdiction over a 
case was intended for nations whose court systems are without the ability or desire to 
actually conduct a legitimate trial, neither of which characterize the court system of 
the United States.175
The United States’ contention that the Rome Statute provides insufficient checks 
over the ICC is also not supported by the provisions of the Statute.  The Rome 
Statute provides both internal and external checks on investigations and 
prosecutions.  The Rome Statute places internal checks on the ability of the 
Prosecutor to initiate investigations176 and on cases referred to it by Rome Statute 
member States.177  Additionally, the Rome Statute provides an external check on the 
ICC’s ability to prosecute a case by allowing the United Nations Security Council to 
defer ICC jurisdiction by resolution. 178   The United States’ contention of an 
unchecked Court misinterprets the ICC’s need for political independence as the 
ICC’s desire to conduct political prosecutions upon the United States.  While the 
checks placed upon the ICC by the Rome Statute are not the same as those exerted 
on the courts of the United States, the ICC is not the unchecked power that the 
United States would have the rest of the world believe. 
The last U.S. argument against the ICC maintains that the ICC is not bound to 
respect the rights found in the U.S. Constitution.  In fact the exact opposite is true.  
The Rome Statute guarantees every trial right granted by the U.S. Constitution and 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States with the exception of a jury 
trial and conviction by unanimous decision.179  Upon first impression the absence of 
a trial by jury and the absence of a conviction by unanimous decision seem to be the 
ICC’s fatal flaws.  However, the U.S. military tribunals proposed to prosecute 
terrorists are also devoid of both a jury and a unanimous decision for conviction, yet 
the military tribunals have been deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court180 and 
                                                                
174See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 and art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
175 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 17 (defining “unwillingness” and 
“inability” to investigate or prosecute). 
176Id. at art. 15(3), 15(4) (stating the Prosecutor must obtain the authorization of the Pre-
Trial Chamber prior to initiating an investigation). 
177Id. at art. 18(1), 18(2) (providing that upon referral of a case to the ICC, the Prosecutor 
must give notice to States with bases of jurisdiction over the case and defer to those States’ 
investigation or prosecution). 
178Id. at art. 16 (allowing for twelve-month renewable deferrals by the Security Council).  
179A complete comparison of rights between the U.S. Constitution and the Rome Statute is 
available on pages 30-33 of this note. 
180Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (stating that the President had the Constitutional 
authority to utilize military tribunals to try violations of international law of war). 
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justified by the President of the United States. 181   Moreover, the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia are also conducted without juries 
and without unanimous verdicts for conviction.182  The United States approved the 
formation of the International Criminal Tribunals and their method of adjudication 
over genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and therefore, expressly 
endorsed those courts as fair and equitable courts despite the lack of juries and 
unanimous verdicts.  Therefore, from a legal perspective, it would be inconsistent for 
the United States to argue that while the Rome Statute provides virtually every trial 
right found in the Constitution of the United States, the lack of a jury trial and 
unanimous decision represents disrespect for the U.S. Constitution. 
All indications are that the United States’ legal arguments opposing the ICC are 
without merit and cannot support the its adverse position against the ICC.  
Consequently, the actual justification for U.S. opposition to the ICC may be found in 
political justifications as opposed to legitimate jurisprudential concerns.  
Nonetheless, the United States’ concerns regarding the ICC and its jurisdiction are 
valid concerns for a global superpower.  As a superpower, the United States has 
military forces stationed around the world.  By ratifying the Rome Statute the United 
States exposes U.S. troops and senior government officials to the ICC’s jurisdiction 
for violations of the Rome Statute regardless of where the transgression occurred.183
However, by not ratifying the Rome Statute, the United States is immune from ICC 
jurisdiction for Rome Statute violations that occur outside the borders of ICC 
member States.184  Therefore, the United States could easily justify its stance against 
the ICC by proclaiming that as an economic, military and political superpower it 
cannot afford to be restrained from pursuing its foreign policy and acting in its best 
interest by submitting its citizens to the jurisdiction of the ICC.  While this position 
would hardly be popular with the international community, it is a far superior 
justification for opposing the ICC when compared to the impotent legal arguments 
posited by the United States in its opposition to the International Criminal Court. 
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181See generally Exec. Order No. 222, supra note 162, at § 1.   
182See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 19. 
183See Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 12. 
184An example of immunity from ICC jurisdiction would be if the United States were to 
attack Iraq and violate the Rome Statute’s prohibition against genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.  See generally Rome Statute, supra note 26, at art. 12(2).  Since neither the 
United States nor Iraq is a member to the Rome Statute, the ICC could not exert jurisdiction 
over any U.S. personnel that engaged in the illegal act or for that matter any U.S. government 
official that may have approved of the illegal action.  Id.
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